As we all know, absent from the new CBA is any new agreement on free agency. MLS commissioner Don Garber said on Saturday, “Players will have greater rights at the expiration of their agreements but they will not be free agents within the league.”

What the players got was a “re-entry draft,” the particular mechanisms of which are as yet not clearly defined.

Jimmy Conrad of the Kansas City Wizards said of the new re-entry draft plan, “It’s a way for a player to be exposed to every other team in the league . . . There was a form of free agency we were looking for. There were a lot of concerns. One of the big ones was that when you get waived you should be free. If a team doesn’t want you they shouldn’t get any compensation for you if another team wants you. They met us halfway on some of the rights stuff or ended up giving us what was fair.”

The “re-entry draft” is not free agency. But, if it was clear to we fans through the comments of various owners as the strike deadline loomed near that free agency was not negotiable at this time, surely it was also clear to the players.

So, where are we?

Some may decide that, given all of the talk about “rights” during the negotiations and the absence of free agency in the new CBA, the players have “lost.”

Others may look at the increase in minimum salaries and annual pay increases, both of which were early and obvious topics when discussing the shortcomings of the previous contract, and be more pleased.

There are three important things to remember.

First, the limbo of a player out of contract and his future still being controlled by to his previous club is over, even if the mechanism of the re-entry draft is yet to be defined. This is a significant victory for the players union.

Second, though the players did not win free agency, the players union will continue the process of making its case to the owners and the public for free agency through the life of the new CBA. They will do so in a league that is still developing, still expanding. Where the league will be in five years is anyone’s guess. The players union will continue to lay the groundwork for negotiations in five years time. Free agency will not go away.

Third, that both sides have so easily expressed their satisfaction with the new contract speaks volumes about an admirable understanding that exists between the league and the players union, an understanding that is not just about what is fair in negotiations, but what is possible given the current place of soccer in the American sport landscape.

Throughout the negotiations, a third party, while not physically present, must have been ever present in the minds of negotiators from both sides: American soccer fans, old, new, or as yet unknown. It goes without saying that, in this crucial year in the history of soccer in America - a World Cup year with an expanding and increasingly competitive first division professional league - a strike would have been catastrophic.

Say what you will about whether the owners or the players “won” with the new CBA, the bottom line is that we, the fans, won. Speaking for myself, I come from a union family and have supported the union cause all my life. But right now, soccer in America is more important to me than whether the players have free agency. Whether or not I feel differently in five years is the kind of conflict that I think most of us will be more than happy to encounter.

Here are the key points of the new contract. Let us know what you think.

Guaranteed Contracts: Any player with at least three years of league service who is at least 24 years old will have a guaranteed contract.

Club’s Salary Budgets: Salary budgets for each club will increase by 10.15% from $2.315 million per club in 2009 to $2.55 million in 2010. There will be an further increase of 5% per year for the remainder of the contract. (It is unclear if the 5% increase is based on the 2009 salary budget for each club or will be cumulative.)

Minimum Salary: Senior roster players will see a minimum salary increase of 17.64% from $34,000 in 2009 to $40,000 in 2010. There will be an further increase of 5% per year for the remainder of the contract. (Same as above.)

Player Movement: To prevent clubs from bidding against each other for out of contract players, a “re-entry draft” will be established by the league. While the details of this new draft have yet to be finalized, the draft will apply to players in the following categories:

“Option Not Exercised”: A player who is at least 23 years old with three years of league service will be made available to all clubs in the re-entry draft at his option salary.

“Contract Terminated”: If a player is at least 22 years old with at least one year of league service and is asked to take a pay cut after his contract is terminated, that player will be made available to all clubs in the re-entry draft at his current salary.

“Contract Expires”:

1. If a player is at least 30 years old with eight years of league service when his contract ends with a club, he will be made available in the re-entry draft unless that club makes a qualified offer to renew the player’s contract. The offer must be at least 105% of the player’s last salary. Offers made by other clubs in the re-entry draft must be at least 105% of the player’s last salary.
2. If a player is at least 25 years old with at least four years of service in the league when his contract ends with a club, the player will be made available in the re-entry draft unless that club makes a qualified offer to renew the player’s contract. The offer must be at least equal to the player’s last salary. Offers made by other clubs in the re-entry draft must be at least equal of the player’s last salary.

Options in Player Contracts: Contracts for players who are at least 24 years old with four years of league service will have a maximum of two options. Contracts for all other players can have a maximum of three options.

Compensation, Benefits and Bonuses:

1. If a player’s annual compensation is less than $125,000 and that player plays in at least 66% of his clubs games, the minimum increase in base salary is 10%. If a player’s annual compensation is less than $125,000 and that player plays in at least 75% of his clubs games, the minimum increase in base salary is 12.5%. (It is unclear how “plays in” is defined.)
2. All players will have full health care for himself and his family at no cost. The league will increase contributions to player’s 401(k) accounts. Appearance fees, per diem when travelling and relocation expense reimbursement will increase.
3. Players will receive bonuses for wins and appearance fees for international friendliest.

Group License: The group licensing agreement will be extended through 2015, one year longer than the new CBA.

Reserve Division: A joint commission comprised of representatives of the League and the Players Union will be established to study the re-introduction of the Reserve Division. In the event that club rosters are expanded with the re-introduction of the Reserve Division, the salary for those players will be a minimum of $31,250 with additional annual increases.

MLS commissioner Don Garber and MLSPU executive director Bob Foose made the announcement via a teleconference on Saturday.

Commissioner Garber said:

We are very pleased to have reached agreement on a new Collective Bargaining Agreement with the MLS Players Union . . . This new agreement allows us to work with our players to continue our mutual efforts to build the sport of soccer in North America. We worked hard during the past few months to develop a new agreement that addressed many of the players’ most important issues and look forward to a meaningful and productive new relationship over the next five years.

I would like to thank the players and the leadership of the Union for their involvement and commitment to the collective bargaining process as well as our fans for their patience as we worked together to reach an agreement . . . I also want to thank George Cohen for his expertise in assisting the parties though mediation.

Executive director Foose said,

The Union is happy with this agreement as it addresses the core issue of players’ rights and we look forward to working cooperatively with the League going forward.

The new agreement, coming just two days before the strike deadline and five days before the start of the season, is subject to the approval of the MLS Board of Governors and the membership of the MLSPU. If approved, the new contract will cover the next five seasons and expire on December 31st, 2014.

The Philly Soccer Page’s Tim Ulrich reported earlier today the following details: “Concessions were made in the areas of guaranteed contracts, out-of contract player movement, improved salaries, and revenue sharing. The league however will retain its single-entity structure and did not concede free-agency. Out of contract players will be re-allocated via a draft of some sort.”

The Philly Soccer Page will provide further updates as the detail of the new agreement become known.

The recent banter from owners is an interesting twist that has not really been a part of the rumors in the past few weeks. Predictably, the owners are crying about their financial situation but I was more interested in the comments of Dave Cheketts, owner of Real Salt Lake. To paraphrase his long diatribe, Cheketts says that if the players decide to strike, they clearly have not considered how the owners would “be forced” to respond. (You can listen to the full interview here.) Hmm, sounds like the players hard-line was just curbed by the threat of scabs or worse. Lets hope they get something done.

UPDATE!!: As of 1PM on Saturday, March 20th, the owners and players have reached a new five year bargaining agreement which they announced via conference call. Concessions were made in the areas of guaranteed contracts, out-of contract player movement, improved salaries, and revenue sharing. The league however will retain its single-entity structure and did not concede free-agency. Out of contract players will be re-allocated via a draft of some sort. Details of the CBA are unavailable at this time though they should become clear in the next few days. We will not truly understand the impact of the new CBA for months or years, but the owners and players being able to reach an agreement will have an immediate impact as the season and expansion Philadelphia Union can now start on time.

On the face of it, the article seems quite authoritative. It was written by Frank Dell’Appa, a respected writer, is in a respected newspaper, and is full of quotes from “local attorney Steve Gans.” Gans seems to be an authoritative source with a sharp memory of the NASL team of the  time, the Boston Tea Men. He says, for example,

In 1977 and ’78, NASL teams had a lot of success and were getting TV contracts. The league had momentum and teams like the Tea Men were getting 30,000 [at Foxboro Stadium] going head to head with a Red Sox-Yankees game at Fenway.

“Then, the first TV game they had on Channel 4, [the Tea Men] used replacement players against the Philadelphia Fury. There was a crowd of 400 rattling around at Veterans Stadium, which tells you the quality wasn’t good.

Gans’ authority as a source is underscored by his apparent history with soccer. In college at the time of the strike, Gans says that he was approached by the Tea Men to be a scab player during the NASL strike, which he refused to do. A few decades later Gans “offered to organize an alternative players union in an attempt to reach a settlement” during the protracted legal proceedings surrounding the Fraser et al v. Major League Soccer case which challenged the league’s single entity status.

The article certainly paints a gloomy picture. Not only does Gans intimate that the NFL Players Association’s funding of both the NASL strike and the Fraser case means they are trying to scuttle a growing competitor, he unequivocally states that “Of all the things that led to the NASL’s demise, that [strike] was one of the top five things.” Who could blame the more pessimistic or less informed among us for drawing the conclusion that dark historical forces means that a strike by MLS players will result in the death of the MLS? I fancy myself something of a soccer history fan and the article freaked me out.

But it turns out that the Boston Globe article is littered with factual errors. That Dell’Appa has to state that the official attendance figure for the Fury/Team Men match was actually 3,291 and not 400 should have been reason enough for him to be skeptical about what Gans has to say. Here are a few more errors, pointed out in a recent post on kenn.com by Kenn Tomasch: the Boston Tea Men did not exist in 1977. While the Tea Men did get 30,000 spectators for a game against the Cosmos in 1978, the Red Sox were in Chicago that day. In the 1978 season the Tea Men never had a home game that went up against a Red Sox/Yankees game. Of the assertion by Gans that the 1979 strike was one of the top five reasons the NASL folded, Tomasch simply says “Bollocks.” (More on that later.)

The Boston Globe article was widely cited on the web. With this in mind, a look back at the events surrounding the NASL strike is warranted. What follows is a review of the history of the 1979 strike with some thoughts about how it compares with the current situation between MLS and the Players Union.

Just what were the issues that led to the strike in 1979?

The reason the players went on strike in 1979 was simply because the NASL owners refused to recognize the North American Soccer League Players Association (NASLPA).

The owners continued to refuse to recognize the NASLPA even after being ordered to do so by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). Arguing that financial disparities among the league’s clubs would make a league-wide labor agreement impossible, the owners wanted negotiations to be made on a club-by-club basis.

The NASLPA gambled that a strike would force the owners to recognize the players association more quickly than a protracted legal battle. After 252-113 vote by the players, the strike officially began on Friday, April 13, 1979. The next day the head of the NASLPA, Ed Garvey, told the Washington Post that the strike could be settled “as soon as management comes to the bargaining table. It won’t cost them a dime. There’s only one issue involved, recognition of the union.”

This is clearly not the case with the current labor dispute.

By the way, Ed Garvey was also executive director of the National Football League Players Association, a position he held from 1971 through 1983. This turns the suggestion by Gans that NFLPA support of the NASLPA suggests some kind of ominous conspiracy into ridiculous famcy.

Money had nothing to do with the NASL strike?

Wage disparity was a reason why, in August 1977, 93% of the players voted in favor of forming a union but it wasn’t why the union went on strike. Garvey described raising minimum wage levels in the league as a long term goal and not as a reason for the strike.

When MLS players and fans talk about the issue of wages today, the issue is generally one of MLS players being paid poorly compared to players in other leagues around the world. For many foreign players, particularly those from Britain, playing in the NASL would have meant a rise in pay versus what they would have earned back home.

In 1979 the the wage disparity issue also wasn’t conceived of as soccer players compared to other professional athletes in the United States and Canada. Although higher wages were certainly desired, players generally recognized that both the sport and the league were growing and that it was unrealistic to expect wages on level with MLB or the NFL.

Rather, in 1979 wage disparity was primarily an issue of what American players were paid compared to what foreign players were paid.

At the time of the strike, Americans made up 45% of the players in the league’s 24 teams and earned on average approximately $12,000 a year. Foreign players earned on average approximately $20,000 a year. Using a historical currency converter, this works out to about $36,000 a year for American players and $60,000 for foreign players.

Using figures from the MLS Players Union, Sports Illustrated reports that the average salary for a MLS player at the beginning of last season was $147,945. Because the average is skewed by the high salaries of a few select players, SI rightly suggests that the median income of $88,000 is perhaps more representative. Unfortunately, I cannot find a median income figure for NASL players in 1979 to compare their wages with those of MLS players but it may be true that most MLS players are comparatively better off than their NASL counterparts. That said, since a median income of $88,000 still means that half of the players in the MLS make less than that, perhaps it would be wise to take Kasey Keller’s assertion that a strike will not be about money with a grain of salt.

What happened during the strike?

The 1979 strike was an unmitigated disaster.

The league scheduled a full slate of games with teams taking whatever steps necessary to fill open roster slots. The three Canadian teams in the league - Edmonton Drillers, Toronto Blizzard and Vancouver Whitecaps - were prohibited from striking by Canadian law. At least six U.S. teams – Chicago Sting, Philadelphia Fury, New York Cosmos, San Jose Earthquakes, Tampa Bay Rowdies and Tulsa Roughnecks – fielded full strength teams of regulars. The remaining teams had varying degrees of strike participation with as little as one Los Angeles Aztec player and as many as seventeen Portland Timbers players refusing to play. (See the very excellent review of what happened over the strike weekend at kenn.com.)

On Tuesday April 17, 1979, NASLPA leaders as well as representatives from Fort Lauderdale Strikers, Washington Diplomats and Rochester Lancers met with the Cosmos to try to convince them to honor the strike. After all, the Cosmos were the league’s showcase club.

The Cosmos remained unconvinced.

Prior to the strike Garvey and the union had interpreted then current immigration law to mean that any foreign player who crossed the picket line would be subject to deportation. For a brief period it seemed that Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) agreed, not that this seems to have prevented foreign players from playing. When INS announced that it would not deport foreign players on the same day that NASLPA representatives were meeting with the Cosmos, the strike was finished. Not only had the NASLPA demonstrated that it lacked effective leverage with the league, the INS announcement meant that it had no leverage over the league’s marquee players.

The NASLPA officially ended the strike the next day. In all only 143 players honored the strike, which had lasted only five days. The NASLPA had gambled and lost.

What happened with the NASLPA next?

On May 4, 1979, the Washington Post reported that the NLRB had ordered team owners to bargain in good faith with the NASLPA, finding that the owners had engaged in unfair labor practices since October of 1978 when they refused to recognize the players’ union.

The owners appealed.

On March 26, 1980, the Washington Post reported that the U.S. Court of Appeals had found that “the league and its 24 member clubs were joint employers and that a collective bargaining agent for all players on the U.S. clubs was appropriate,” thus upholding the original decision of the NLRB.

The owners appealed again.

On November 20, 1980, the Washington Post reported that the Department of Labor and the INS were refusing certify NASL indoor players or approve visa applications for Canadian indoor teams to enter the U.S. pending a finding of the NLRB.

Finally, in the May 7, 1984, issue of Sports Illustrated, it was reported that a collective bargaining agreement had been reached. A main component of the agreement was a $825,000 maximum payroll per year for each club, to be achieved by mandatory annual 10% reductions. Howard Samuels, president of the NASL said “The National Basketball Association has a salary cap system based on a percentage of team revenues, but, for the first time in America, this is a total cap . . . and one day, even though this was forced on us, all of American pro sport will thank us.”

The agreement was too little too late – the league folded that year.

Why did the NASL fold?

It wasn’t the strike.

Tomasch makes the very appropriate argument that the reasons the NASL folded are several. Over-rapid expansion, lack of infrastructure (not one team played in its own, purpose built soccer stadium, little player development of U.S. players), ill-equipped or ill-prepared owners who thought they could make a quick buck from “America’s sport of the ’80’s), the rise of indoor soccer (this at a time when attempts to “Americanize” soccer were rampant) and competition from MILS, and the “Cosmos-effect,” which anyone who has seen Once In a Lifetime will be familiar with, are all good candidates for a top five list. Add to this list the over reliance on foreign players and the effect of FIFA not naming the U.S. the host country for the 1986 World Cup and you begin to have an even more complete list.

Did the strike negatively effect the development of the league?

No.

In the year of the strike, the NASL saw its highest season attendance average. This was topped in 1980. But after 1980, the league began to fall apart. Here’s Tomasch again,

The real beginning of the end was at the end of the 1980 season, when Rochester, Houston and Washington folded (the Dips having been abandoned by MSG) and Philadelphia, Memphis, New England (having lost Lipton Tea’s ownership) and Detroit (which became the new Diplomats in DC) moved. Within a year, they’d also lost Atlanta, Washington, Minnesota, Dallas, Los Angeles, California and Calgary [or two thirds of the 1978 expansion class] and it was all over but the shouting. The NASL was a dead man walking its last two years.

From a league high of 24 teams, the NASL entered the 1984 season with only nine teams. This had everything to do with profitability and nothing to do with the strike of 1979. If the strike had been a significant cause of the end of the NASL, wouldn’t it make sense that more of us would know about it?

Which isn’t to say that a players strike now wouldn’t harm both the MLS or the growth of soccer in America. But one should be careful about drawing conclusions about the potential MLS strike from the history of the NASL strike. While the strike is an important event in the history of both the NASL and soccer in America, its relevance to the current negotiations between the MLS and Players Union is limited. There are plenty of reasons to worry and be pessismistic today without reference to a five day strike that is little remembered.

“You got to know when to hold ‘em, know when to fold ‘em.”

I’m not sure what’s stranger: Waking up singing Kenny Rogers’ “The Gambler” or that I found some way to apply it to Major League Soccer. (On the positive side, it prompted me to watch this The Muppet Show video, which definitely put a hop in my step.)

Click here to view the embedded video.

Either way, message to MLS management and players: It’s time to fold ‘em. Give ground and compromise, or your season and maybe your entire league will go into the tank.

“From an entertainment standpoint, we haven’t made enough of an imprint on the national psyche,” Seattle Sounders majority owner Joe Roth told The Olympian newspaper. “… I don’t think there will be a national outcry like with the NFL if somehow we wouldn’t be out there for a year – which would be terrible. Everyone would lose their jobs. We would all lose our franchises. And that would be that.”

Is he laying out the worst case scenario? Sure, of course he is. But is he wrong? Time will tell.

Check out C. Horridus’ post from the other day. Here’s a guy who’s been pretty gung ho for the Union to begin play and is generally one of the team’s biggest fans. Now he’s saying, “my time is too rare right now to waste it on a league that may self-implode.”

Seriously. I get you, Kev, big time.

Right now, we’re sitting back and waiting. Either the league will implode in the next week, or we’ll watch Philadelphia Union play the Seattle Sounders. Whatever. Nothing we can do about it but sit back and watch the potential train wreck.

Players could strike as early as Monday, Soccer by Ives reported Wednesday, citing anonymous sources. The Houston Chronicle reported the same thing last week. Despite the anonymous sources in both reports, I’m betting it’s true.

This shortens the timetable for negotiations and likely explains why the owners are finally going public, but it also means players could go on strike and use that for leverage to force a deal before opening day. Would MLS leadership cave based on that? Don’t know.

Landon Donovan says he will get involved in negotiations. Prior to joining Everton on loan, he had been outspoken in his views supporting the players’ position.

“There are realities to the business that we’re in and unfortunately for too long the business has been one-sided,” Donovan told ESPN. “We need basic rights if we’re going to continue playing. We want rights that are afforded to other players in other countries around the world that we don’t have here.”

Of course, the black humor irony here is that Donovan might be the only guy in MLS who benefits from a strike. If there’s a strike, he could return to Everton. He has rejoined the Galaxy and scored two goals in the Galaxy’s 8-0 win over PDL club Hollywood United. Just a minor dip in the competition level from the EPL, eh?

Donovan back to Everton. Yes, the only silver lining in all of this.

The players union released this statement today:

Bethesda, MD (Thursday, February 25, 2010) – The Major League Soccer Players Union (the “Union”) today announced that the collective bargaining agreement between the Union and Major League Soccer (“MLS”) will not be extended past the February 25 deadline previously set by the Union and MLS.

“Effective at midnight tonight, our collective bargaining agreement with MLS will expire,” said Union Executive Director Bob Foose.

Foose added that, “while we expect that negotiations with MLS will resume at some point, there simply hasn’t been enough progress made in the negotiations to date to warrant an extension of the old agreement. We have advised our players to keep working for the time being, but as of Friday they will be doing so without a CBA. In the meantime, all options are being considered as the process continues. We are completely committed to forging real changes to the way MLS players are treated.”

In response, the league reiterated its previous stance by releasing this statement today.

Basically, nothing happened. The deadline came. The deadline went. They didn’t extend the contract. The possibility of a strike still lingers above everyone’s head. Go us. Feel free to rant in the comments below.

How soon before we see the Union line up like this in Philly?

If Major League Soccer players strike, it could be a disaster for Philadelphia Union.

An expansion franchise needs momentum from the get-go. Right now, the Union have it. Opening day is a month away. Their stadium in Chester is progressing. Philadelphia’s going to host the final World Cup tune-up for the U.S. National Team. People are excited. Philadelphia soccer is on the way up.

But a strike that delays the MLS season could kill that.

When sabers rattled this weekend over the league’s failure to meet the players’ demands for free agency and guaranteed contracts,  it became very clear that a strike remains possible. The league responded by saying they’ve offered to spend another $60 million on players and pledging to start the season without a new labor contract. (For more on free agency and the other key issues, click here.)

None of this is good for soccer fans in the Delaware Valley.

Philadelphia isn’t Seattle or Toronto, with a stadium accessible by public transit in the heart of an international city. The real models for the Union are the Chicago Fire, Colorado Rapids and FC Dallas. Like the Union, each has a stadium outside the nearest major city, has major league teams in the big four sports, and isn’t what you’d call an “international city.” For each, the stadium is a singular destination. (Check out my 2007 story for more on the comparison.)

Chicago’s Toyota Park, for example, sits in the middle of an industrial nowhere. You go there, and then you go home. Few dinner options afterward, no walking to the train, one lonely pub on the drive home.  It’s out of the way for most people. It’s a great place to watch a game, but that’s about it.

Sound at all like Chester?

Sure, the most devoted and excited fans, such as the Sons of Ben, will head to Union games whether the season starts in March or August. But the most devoted fans may not be enough to guarantee success in a crowded sports market like Philadelphia, particularly with the club located outside the city without train access. Dallas surely draws its most devoted fans too, but the 9,883 fans per game they drew in 2009 don’t make them a success.

The Union need to sell the fringe fans on their product, and there’s nothing like a work stoppage to sour a fan base. (Ask Major League Baseball and the NHL.) They need to maintain the momentum they have right now, the good will shown toward a franchise that looks like they’re doing a lot of things right on the field. Unfortunately, this labor dispute is outside their control.

In the end, the Union could get toasted by a union – and the management that won’t give in.

What do you think? How do you think the Union would fare if the season starts late? What do you think the prospects of a strike are? Weigh in below.

Larentowicz, trapped in contract limbo

Right now, MLS players can’t sign with another MLS team after their contracts expire unless their team lets them. That’s why a guy like West Chester’s Jeff Larentowicz needed a trade to leave New England, despite having played out his contract. No major American sports league or foreign soccer league restricts their players like this.

That’s why there could be a lockout or strike when the current MLS collecting bargaining agreement expires on Jan. 31,  delaying or even ending Philadelphia Union’s inaugural season before it starts.

Players say the league flouts FIFA regulations on player contracts. The league says FIFA is OK with them. FIFA avoided the dispute, likely because it’s largely irrelevant in this case. Why?

European leagues are not the model for MLS. The NFL is. With stable, profitable franchises and competitive parity, the NFL has no Portsmouth or Leeds collapsing into financial oblivion. Even small market teams like Jacksonville and Buffalo compete. To succeed long-term, the MLS must become like the NFL, with its revenue sharing, player acquisition system, stadium controls and competitive parity.

MLS has followed nearly every best practice of American sports leagues, but it holds onto an anachronistic sports management concept by not allowing free agency. This is basically the same as baseball’s old reserve clause, which was struck down by a court arbitrator in 1975. MLS may have already won in court, but American sports history shows that means little. Baseball and football players eventually won free agency, but they needed labor battles to get there.

MLS players have one good argument: Free agency. Their other points don’t fly in American sports. Here’s why and how it breaks down.

The international players union says MLS violates FIFA regulations on several points. (Also check out Soccer America’s breakdown on this.)

• “Player contracts are routinely terminated by the league during their term, as almost 80% of players in MLS do not have guaranteed contracts;”

MLS may violate sections 13 and 16 of FIFA’s transfer regulations forbidding unilateral and mid-season termination of contracts, but Article 1 offers some leeway. Again, FIFA isn’t the model for success. NFL  teams routinely cut players and end contracts mid-season, and it bolsters club stability by freeing teams from contracts with over-the-hill players. (Players frontload their contracts to account for it.) The question is what your severance payment is.

• “MLS operates as a cartel in that every player’s contract must be entered into with the league instead of his club;”

Irrelevant right now if you allow free agency.

• “The contract of virtually every player in the league contains multiple unilateral one-year options that may only be exercised by the league;”

Option years are common in American sports contracts. A player can choose not to sign the contract or hold out until he gets a contract he likes (though that’s never a good option).

• “Virtually any player in the league can be transferred to another club within the league without his consent even if such transfer is international, such as a transfer from an MLS club in the United States to or from an MLS club in Canada;”

Trades are normal in American sports leagues. It’s not changing.

• “There is no freedom of movement for any MLS player to any other MLS clubs when his contract expires – in fact, even if a player’s contract is unilaterally terminated by a club during its term, that club continues to hold such player’s rights and he is prohibited from signing with another club in the league.”

This is the kicker, where MLS players have an argument that we’ve heard before in American sports. The NFL and MLB once prevented free agency too. They initially succeeded in the courtroom, only to fail in the long run.

MLS players must hope for the same. They filed suit in 1997 after the league’s first season, but they lost their case, Fraser v. Major League Soccer. They had three major claims:

• Count 1 –  MLS and its operator/investors violated Sherman Act by agreeing not to compete for player services.

The court ruled in 2000 that MLS is a single-entity, so there can’t be collusion.

• Count 2 – The combined assets of MLS operator/investors substantially lessened competition and created monopoly in violation of the Clayton Act.

The court ruled that you can’t reduce competition in an existing market if there was no previous existing market (i.e. no preexisting Division 1 soccer).

• Count 3 – MLS (possibly conspiring with U.S. Soccer Federation) monopolized the market for Division 1 soccer players in the U.S. by preventing sanctioning of another Division 1 league.

The court ruled that players failed to prove the U.S. is the relevant geographic market or that the relevant product market is limited to Division 1 soccer players. Considering how relevant they seem, maybe a different legal strategy wins this argument in a subsequent case. This appears to have shot down arguments about restraint of trade against players.

____________

American sports leagues’ greatest strength is their competitive parity. You never know before a season who will win the championship. There hasn’t been a multi-decade dynasty in 30 years (whereas most European soccer leagues see the same teams dominate every year).  That parity exists largely because of revenue sharing, salary caps (NFL version), amateur drafts and waivers systems that give the most prized players to the worst teams. (Lack of promotion and relegation helps too.)

MLS has taken those concepts to the next logical step, controlling them more firmly thanks to its single-entity ownership, which comes with “operators/investors” for each club.

The league runs into trouble by controlling that competitive environment too much. The model works great on paper but doesn’t account for people wanting to choose their hometowns. Players are basically told that, if you want to make a living as a first division soccer player in the U.S., then you’ll go where we tell you. If you don’t like it, you can leave,  because we’re the only game in town. To get to a team he wants, a player’s suitor must set up a trade, as was done in the Larentowicz and Troy Perkins trades, and even then there’s no guarantee he’ll get the club he wants.

Players in every American sports league won free agency by striking or winning lawsuits, but they didn’t play in young leagues in danger of collapse, like MLS. If MLS players strike, soccer fans have other TV options like the EPL, La Liga, Serie A, Bundesliga, and Mexican league. Players could go abroad.

Is an MLS collapse good for American soccer? Probably not. MLS has probably the most realistic model for pioneering sustainable professional soccer in the U.S. That doesn’t mean it’s perfect.

Should MLS take the “training wheels” off, as Alexi Lalas put it, and free clubs and players from the the single-entity system’s constrictions with free agency and eliminating the salary cap, some teams would thrive, but most would probably fail.  American soccer might prove no different from England, Spain, Italy and Greece, with big market teams in New York, Los Angeles and Toronto dominating and a dozen teams struggling  for profitability. That might fly in Europe, but the U.S. has four other major sports leagues with which to compete.

MLS could develop a free agency model that maintains competitive balance without blowing up its whole management system. The NFL offers compensatory draft picks for free agents lost. MLS could do something similar with its amateur draft, allocations or lottery acquisitions for returning national team players.

It seems better than a strike or lockout, doesn’t it?

A lock out would effectively shut down the league as preparations for the 2010 World Cup begin to gather steam.

The Players Union argues that, for the MLS, a “deal” means a continuation of the status quo.

Said Keller, who has been outspoken on this issue on his blog, “What we are looking for are the same basic rights that players enjoy in other leagues around the world . . . We have made great strides in developing the game in the United States. But we can’t truly compete internationally, either for players or fans, with a system that is so radically different than other leagues around the world.”

Donovan added, “the league shutting down MLS in February would do real damage to the development of the game in the United States and to our efforts to prepare for South Africa. It is difficult to understand why the owners would take this course, when all we are asking for are the same rights enjoyed by other players around the world, not just in the biggest leagues, but in leagues of all sizes.”

The statement describes current MLS policy as violating FIFA regulations on several counts:

• Because nearly 80% of the players in MLS do not have guaranteed contracts, they’re employment is routinely terminated by the league.
• The league operates as a cartel because players contracts are with the league rather than a club.
• Most player contracts contain multiple one-year options that can only be exercised by the league.
• Almost any player in the league can be transferred within the league without his consent, including international transfers between US and Canadian MLS teams.
• Because clubs retain control over players rights even if a player’s contract is terminated during its term, players have no freedom of movement. Thus, a player can only sign with another club with the approval of that player’s former club.

The MLS does not believe that it violates FIFA statutes. League president Mark Abbott told ESPNsoccernet in December that MLS regularly reviews its policies to “ensure it is compliant with the cumbersome FIFA regulations.” According to Abbott, the league “has always been compliant with FIFA.”